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Note
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PERMITS SCHOOLS TO SUBMIT
UNFINISHED HOMEWORK IN L.J. EX REL. N.N.J. V. SCHOOL BOARD
OF BROWARD COUNTY BY REQUIRING ONLY “MATERIAL”
IMPLEMENTATION OF IEPS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
MADELINE E. SMITH*
“The denial of the right to education and to equal opportunity within this
Nation for handicapped children . . . is a travesty of justice and a denial of
equal protection of the law.”1
I. CLASS IS IN SESSION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA)
In 2018, over six million children across the United States received
special education services in the American public school system.2  Prior to
1975, though, children with disabilities had limited access to educational
opportunities.3  More than 1.75 million students with disabilities in the
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1. 120 Cong. Rec. 15,271 (1974) (advocating for right of students with disabil-
ities to receive public education while attempting to pass Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act).  The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA)
was the prior name of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). See
id.  Senator Harrison Williams was the principal author of this legislation in 1974.
See id.
2. 2018 Annual Report to Congress on the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://sites.ed.gov/idea/2018-annual-report-to-congress-
on-the-individuals-with-disabilities-education-act/#Ages-3-21-Part-B [https://
perma.cc/Z9WG-XN8L] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019) (reporting number of stu-
dents served in 2018 under the IDEA).  This is the fortieth annual report to Con-
gress to describe the nation’s progress in providing a free appropriate public
education for children with disabilities and measuring the implementation of the
other goals of the IDEA. See id.  See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2018) (providing
procedural requirements for obtaining disability status under the IDEA).  This re-
quires that the local educational agency shall conduct an evaluation for the child
suspected of having a disability with a variety of assessment tools. See § 1414.
3. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2018) (stating that before the enactment of the
EHA, educational needs of millions of children with disabilities in the United
States were not met because they were largely excluded from public school system
and did not receive appropriate educational services when they were included); see
also Antonis Katsiyannis, Mitchell L. Yell & Renee Bradley, Reflections on the 25th
Anniversary of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 22 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL
(451)
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United States in 1974 did not receive educational services, while more
than three million students did not receive an education appropriate to
their needs.4  In fact, many states even had laws that allowed for the exclu-
sion of students with disabilities, such as children who were deaf, blind,
emotionally disturbed, or intellectually disabled, from schooling
altogether.5
Due to the long-standing history of unequal treatment of students
with disabilities, a new wave of reform presented itself in the mid-1960s.6
Parents, interest groups, state legislatures, federal courts, and other advo-
cates paved the way for new legislation to provide rights to children with
disabilities.7  After multiple pieces of state and federal legislation, Con-
gress finally passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
EDUC. 324, 324–25 (2001) (analyzing development of the IDEA and reiterating the
history of limited access to education that children with disabilities had prior to its
enactment in the 1970s).
4. See Katsiyannis, Yell & Bradley, supra note 3, at 324–25 (providing statistical
information on the number of students with disabilities that were not accommo-
dated in the American public school system prior to 1975).  These authors also
note that because of these limited opportunities within public schools, families
often have to find other types of educational services for their children with disa-
bilities that are frequently far away from home and at their own expense. See id. at
325.
5. See Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities Through
IDEA, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/his-
tory.html [https://perma.cc/QGD4-D99D] (last modified July 19, 2007) (describ-
ing the history of the IDEA and highlighting that students with disabilities were
not just socially excluded from schools but were sometimes excluded by state law as
well).  Prior to the enactment of the IDEA, only one in five children with a disabil-
ity were educated in American public schools. See id. See generally Mitchell L. Yell,
David Rogers & Elisabeth Lodge Rogers, The Legal History of Special Education: What
a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been!, 19 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 219, 226 (1998)
(describing how the IDEA was updated in the 1990 amendments to reflect lan-
guage preference changes).  The 1990 amendments to the IDEA included chang-
ing the language from “handicapped student” to “child/student/individual with a
disability” to emphasize the person first, rather than the disability status. See Yell,
Rogers & Rogers, supra, at 226. See generally Steve Drummond, How the Language of
Special Education Is Evolving, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 17, 2016, 7:15 AM), https://
www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/03/17/469792061/how-the-language-of-special-
education-is-evolving [https://perma.cc/9MC4-S2J6] (explaining how certain
terms, like “retarded,” were once used but are now generally outdated and special
education experts, as well as the general public, do not use them anymore).
6. See Katsiyannis, Yell & Bradley, supra note 3, at 325 (describing movement
for advocating for rights of students with disabilities).  Many of the first efforts
were focused in litigation, particularly using claims that argued students’ rights to
equal educational opportunity under the U.S. Constitution. See id.
7. See id. (describing how litigation efforts of parents and interest groups im-
pacted the rights of students with disabilities). See generally Pa. Ass’n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 300–02 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania could not deny a free public education to any
child, regardless of disability).
2
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(EHA) in 1975, later renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA).8
The IDEA mandates that schools provide students with disabilities a
free appropriate public education (FAPE).9  To provide students with a
FAPE, school districts, along with parents and experts, develop an individ-
ualized education program (IEP) for each child identified as disabled.10
The IEP is the cornerstone of the IDEA, as it is the tool school districts use
to accommodate disabilities and provide each child with a FAPE.11
Since the IDEA’s creation in the 1970s and its various amendments
over the years, school districts, courts, and educational experts have strug-
gled with the meaning of FAPE and the best way to implement it in the
classroom.12  As this area of the law develops, courts and schools continue
to face new issues concerning the interpretation of the IDEA.13  While the
8. See Katsiyannis, Yell & Bradley, supra note 3, at 325–27 (describing how
efforts of advocates and changes in society eventually pushed Congress to create
federal legislation).  Prior to the enactment of the IDEA, other federal legislation
that provided rights to students with disabilities included the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act of 1965, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974, and the Developmen-
tally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1974. See id.
9. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2018) (mandating that children with disabilities have
access to free appropriate public education to ensure equality of opportunity and
full participation in society).
10. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2018) (defining individualized education pro-
grams (IEP)).  Section 1414(d) requires that an IEP have a written statement for
each child with a disability that includes the child’s present levels of academic
achievement, how the child’s disability affects that achievement and progress, a
statement of measurable annual goals for the child to make progress, a description
of the services, and steps needed to make those goals. See id.  The IEP is crafted by
the “IEP team,” composed of the child’s parents, at least one regular education
teacher of the child, at least one special education teacher, a qualified representa-
tive of the local educational agency, and any other individuals who have special
expertise regarding the child that the parents or agency deem appropriate. See id.
11. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (describing IEPs as “the cen-
terpiece of the statute’s education delivery system for disabled children”). Hoing v.
Doe involved multiple disabled students and emphasized the importance of the
IEP. See id.; see also Bonnie Spiro Schinagle, Considering the Individualized Education
Program: A Call for Applying Contract Theory to an Essential Legal Document, 17 CUNY
L. REV. 195, 209 (2013) (describing IEPs as a “cornerstone” of the IDEA).  The IEP
sets forth exactly how to provide a disabled child with a FAPE and describes the
deliverables and desired outcomes for that particular child. See Schinagle, supra, at
209.
12. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct.
988, 993 (2017) (discussing what constitutes a FAPE under the IDEA); see also Bd.
of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204–06
(1982) (issuing the first Supreme Court decision on how to determine whether a
school district provided student with disability a FAPE); Kurtis A. Kemper, Construc-
tion and Application of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400
et seq.—Supreme Court Cases, 13 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 321, at § 7 (2006) (describing the
complicated history of court system deciding what exactly a FAPE is and how
schools are meant to provide it to comply with the IDEA).
13. See generally David Ferster, Broken Promises: When Does a School’s Failure to
Implement an Individualized Education Program Deny a Disabled Student a Free and Ap-
3
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Supreme Court has provided some guidance on how to evaluate whether
the written content of an IEP provides a FAPE, confusion remains around
how to determine whether the implementation of that content complies with
the requirements of the IDEA.14
The Supreme Court articulated its most recent guidance on what con-
stitutes a FAPE in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-115 in 2017,
where the Court held that schools “must offer an IEP reasonably calcu-
lated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.”16  There, the Supreme Court rejected a lower standard
that required schools only to provide “some educational benefit,” stating
that this standard conflicted with the purpose of the IDEA.17  As cases with
questions about IEP implementation arose, some courts have applied a
“materiality standard” to determine whether the school district provided a
disabled student with a FAPE.18  This standard considers whether a school
has failed to implement substantial or significant provisions of the child’s
IEP.19
propriate Public Education, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 71, 77 (2010) (describing that
many courts have struggled to define a FAPE since the IDEA’s enactment).  The
IDEA does not set out clear standards for a FAPE, making it a challenge through-
out the IDEA’s history for schools and courts to decide exactly what “appropriate”
means and what the educational benefit looks like for students with disabilities. See
id.
14. See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999 (holding that schools must “offer an IEP
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of
the child’s circumstances”); see also Ferster, supra note 13, at 86 (explaining differ-
ence between cases determining adequacy of content of IEPs and cases determin-
ing adequacy of implementation of IEPs).  Cases focusing on IEP implementation
occur less frequently because it is unlikely that students in cases will concede that
an IEP was adequate and that that school district simply did not implement it cor-
rectly. See id. at 86–87.  This raises issues, though, when these cases do come
before courts because there is little guidance from precedent with how to proceed.
See id. at 87.
15. 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
16. See id. at 999 (defining level of educational benefit for students with disa-
bilities required by the IDEA).  This was a unanimous decision for the Court. See
id. at 903.
17. See id. at 998–1001 (reversing the Tenth Circuit’s decision, which stated
that in order to provide child with disability a FAPE, a school district must only
provide an educational benefit that is “merely more than de minimis”).  The Court
claimed that the use of this standard can hardly be said to be providing any educa-
tion at all and that it does not comply with the IDEA. See id. at 1001; see also Fer-
ster, supra note 13, at 81–82 (describing circuit court split prior to Endrew F. where
lower courts differed in how they evaluated a FAPE).  Some lower courts adopted a
“some educational benefit” standard, while other courts adopted a “meaningful
benefit” standard. See Ferster, supra note 13, at 81–82.
18. See L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., 927 F.3d 1203, 1213 (11th
Cir. 2019) (concluding that the materiality standard is the appropriate test for
courts to utilize when evaluating a “failure-to-implement case”).
19. See id. (describing materiality standard applied in analysis).
4
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This Note analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s application of the material-
ity standard in L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. School Board of Broward County,20 and
argues that the use of the materiality standard in implementation IEP
cases is inconsistent not only with the reasoning in and underlying princi-
ples of the Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew F., but also with the pur-
pose of the IDEA itself.21  Further, this Note advocates for a different
approach, called the “per se” approach, which is more consistent with the
purpose of the IDEA and Supreme Court precedent.22  Part II explains
important context for understanding the legislative and legal history that
provide the backdrop for L.J.  Part III lays out the facts and procedural
history of L.J.  Part IV breaks down the court’s holding and reasoning in
the case.  Part V critically analyzes the issues in the L.J. decision and advo-
cates for the per se approach.  Finally, Part VI provides discussion around
the potential impact of the L.J. decision.
II. CRACKING OPEN A TEXTBOOK: THE LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL HISTORY
OF THE IDEA
In order to fully understand L.J., one must be aware of the relevant
history surrounding special education law in the United States.  At the
time of its creation, the IDEA attempted to combat the inaccessibility of
educational opportunities for students with disabilities.23  The IDEA con-
tinues to advance those goals by promising students with disabilities an
education appropriate to their needs.24  Over the years, courts attempted
to clarify the IEP provisions and guide schools on how to meet the require-
ments of the IDEA.25  Due to the IDEA’s ambiguity on how exactly to pro-
vide disabled students a FAPE, the legal history surrounding this
legislation is full of disagreement and confusion.26
A. Legislative History and Purpose of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act
Congress first enacted the IDEA under the name Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA), with the purpose of remedying
20. 927 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2019).
21. See infra Part V.
22. See Ferster, supra note 13, at 91–95 (explaining per se approach, which
advocates for the use of standard that requires complete compliance with an IEP,
and not just material compliance as the materiality standard demands).
23. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(B)–(d)(4) (2018) (stating the purpose of
adopting the IDEA as attempting to combat the historically unequal treatment of
students with disabilities).  For further discussion of the history of unequal treat-
ment of children with disabilities in American public schools, see supra notes 3–5
and accompanying text.
24. For a full discussion of the promises of the IDEA, see Section II.A, infra.
25. For a full discussion of the legal history surrounding the IDEA, see Sec-
tion II.B, infra.
26. For complete discussion of the confusion surrounding the FAPE require-
ment of the IDEA, see Section II.B, infra.
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the systemic issue of excluding children with disabilities from the Ameri-
can public school system.27  Prior to the enactment of the EHA, Congress
found that “the educational needs of millions of children with disabilities
were not being fully met” because of inadequate educational services, ex-
clusion from the public school system, isolation from peers, undiagnosed
disabilities, and a lack of adequate resources in the public schools.28  The
EHA allocated federal funding to public schools in order to provide ap-
propriate services.29
At its core, the IDEA promotes cooperation between schools and par-
ents and  mandates that schools provide children with disabilities a
FAPE.30  This is accomplished through an IEP, a detailed plan of special
education services that state officials and parents develop and review annu-
ally for each disabled child.31  Because the IEP acts as the main tool to
achieve the IDEA’s requirement of a FAPE, the majority of litigation arises
from questions surrounding the adequacy of IEPs.32
B. Legal History of Defining a Free Appropriate Public Education
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided Board of Education of the Hendrick
Hudson Central School District v. Rowley,33 a landmark case in the area of
special education law.34  In Rowley, the parents of a deaf child challenged
the adequacy of the child’s IEP when the school district refused to provide
certain extra services, such as a sign language interpreter, due to the stu-
dent’s proper advancement through school and her above-average per-
formance compared to her non-disabled peers.35  The Supreme Court
held that a school provides an adequate FAPE when it delivers personal-
27. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(B) (2018) (acknowledging the history of inad-
equate education for children with disabilities in the United States before the en-
actment of the EHA).
28. See id. § 1400(c)(2)–(3) (listing Congress’s findings accompanying the en-
actment of the IDEA).  Section 1400 also describes the IDEA’s success in ensuring
children with disabilities have access to a FAPE. See id.
29. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2018) (mandating that the federal government allo-
cate resources to provide services to help schools comply with the IDEA); see also id.
(outlining allocation of funds to states to assist in compliance with the IDEA).
30. See Kemper, supra note 12, at § 2 (describing cooperative process estab-
lished between parents and schools as the “core of the IDEA”).  The IEP team
consists of parents and school employees who all work together to develop the IEP
that is most suited for the child. See id.
31. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2018).  For further discussion of what is required
in an IEP, see supra note 10.
32. For a discussion of the importance of the IEP in the IDEA as tool for
providing a FAPE, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.  Also, for a full discus-
sion of the relevant legal questions arising from the IDEA, see Section II.B, infra.
33. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
34. Perry A. Zirkel, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County
School District Re-1: A Meaningful Raising of the Bar?, 341 EDUC. L. REP. 545, 546
(2017) (calling Rowley the Supreme Court’s landmark IDEA decision).
35. See Rowley, 458 at 184–86 (describing the facts that gave rise to the case).
The school had previously supplied the student with a sign language interpreter,
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ized instruction and support services to the student with a disability.36  It
additionally held that the EHA did not require the maximization of poten-
tial for each student with a disability to match the opportunity of a child
without a disability.37  In applying this holding, the Court decided that the
student in Rowley was provided with a FAPE due to her above-average aca-
demic performance, and accordingly, the school was not required to pro-
vide the extra services requested by her parents even if they may maximize
her education in some way.38
Ultimately, Rowley determined that an IEP must be “reasonably calcu-
lated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.”39  Despite this
determination, the issues surrounding how to analyze whether a child has
received a FAPE under the IDEA persist.40  As a result of this ambiguity,
U.S. circuit courts of appeal have applied varying standards.41  The Rowley
standard demanded an “educational benefit,” but the circuit courts disa-
gree on the test to meet that requirement.42  Multiple circuit courts, in-
cluding the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
but the school determined that these services were unnecessary after the inter-
preter reported that the student did not need them. See id. at 184–85.
36. See id. at 185, 189 (reviewing for the first time the meaning of FAPE under
the IDEA when presented with a case involving a deaf child who was performing
better academically than the average child in her class).  The disabled child’s par-
ents claimed that she was not receiving a FAPE because the school district did not
provide her with the opportunity to reach her full potential. See id. at 185.
37. See id. at 198–200 (reasoning that the EHA does not require schools to
provide opportunities for students with disabilities to reach their maximum poten-
tial, as that is too difficult to measure).
38. See id. at 208–10 (holding that the EHA does not require schools to reach
their maximum potential due to the student’s advanced academic performance).
The Court decided that even though a sign language interpreter may help the
disabled child in some way, that was not enough of a reason to require the school
district to provide the service, as the IDEA only requires personalized instruction
and support services that aid the student’s education, not ones that maximize it.
See id.
39. See id. at 200–01 (providing that the standard for determining whether a
student with a disability has received a FAPE under the IDEA is that child has
received educational benefit through an IEP).  The Court rejected the idea that
the school district must provide a student with a disability with services that will
help them to reach their maximum potential and reach the same opportunity level
as a student without a disability. See id. at 200.
40. See Terrye Conroy & Mitchell L. Yell, Free Appropriate Public Education After
Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District (2017), 35 TOURO L. REV. 101, 107
(2019) (describing ambiguity remaining after the Rowley decision).
41. See id. at 107–08 (explaining the history of the circuit court split prior to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew F.).  For an overview of circuit court deci-
sions on the differing standards for FAPE, see infra notes 43–45 and accompanying
text.
42. See Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 107–08 (describing circuit court split
on the level of educational benefit necessary to meet the requirement of a FAPE
where courts did not agree on whether the school must provide students with disa-
bilities with only some educational benefit or a meaningful educational benefit).
For further discussion of the meaning of these circuit court decisions and the dif-
ferent levels of educational benefit, see infra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
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Circuits, adopted a standard that required school districts to provide stu-
dents with only “some,” or a “de minimis” degree, of educational benefit
to meet the requirement of a FAPE under the IDEA.43  Conversely, the
Third and Sixth Circuits held that the de minimis educational benefit
standard was too low to satisfy a FAPE and adopted a “meaningful benefit”
standard.44  The Fifth Circuit also held that a FAPE required more than a
de minimis educational benefit.45
In 2017, the Supreme Court revisited this issue in Endrew F. v. Douglas
County School District.46  In that case, the Court held that “a school must
offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress ap-
propriate in light of the circumstances.”47  The Supreme Court ultimately
rejected the some educational benefit standard (or the merely more than
de minimis standard) that the Tenth Circuit applied, but also declined to
43. See Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143,
1148–49 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that Congress did not impose any particular sub-
stantive educational standard in the IDEA and only requires that a school provide
a “basic floor of opportunity” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rowley,
458 U.S. at 200)); see also Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 134
(2d Cir. 1998) (applying the lower de minimis standard and holding that the re-
quirement of a FAPE was met); Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607,
612–13 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the IDEA only requires that public schools
provide sufficient special education services so that students have some benefit
from their education); Barnett v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 153–54 (4th
Cir. 1991) (applying lower de minimis standard in assessing whether the FAPE re-
quirement was met); Doe v. Ala. State Dep’t of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 665–66 (11th
Cir. 1990) (holding that lower de minimis standard met the FAPE requirement
under the IDEA); Lachman v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290, 297 (7th Cir.
1988) (applying a lower educational benefit standard to meet the FAPE require-
ment); Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 107–08 (listing circuit courts that adopted
the de minimis standard).  The de minimis standard is a very low educational ben-
efit standard and requires little of the school district in order to provide a FAPE.
See Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 107–08.
44. See Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864 (6th Cir. 2004)
(stating that the IDEA requires an IEP to confer a meaningful educational benefit
in order to meet the threshold for a FAPE).  This court rejected the “some educa-
tional benefit” standard in favor of one requiring more of school districts. See id.;
see also Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir.
1988) (adopting the meaningful benefit standard as necessary to meet require-
ment of a FAPE).  The Third Circuit also affirmatively rejected the de minimis
standard. See Polk, 853 F.2d at 182; see also Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 108
(describing how the Third and Sixth Circuits affirmatively rejected the de minimis
standard).  The Third and Sixth Circuits held the lower standard, one requiring
only some educational benefit, insufficient to provide the type of education guaran-
teed under the IDEA. See Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 108.
45. See Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F. ex rel. Barry F., 118
F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that an IEP must confer meaningful educa-
tional benefits for students with disabilities to comply with the IDEA’s FAPE re-
quirement); see also Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 108 (stating that the Fifth
Circuit held that a FAPE required more than the lower standard).
46. 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017) (acknowledging that the “more difficult prob-
lem” of the appropriate standard for determining when an adequate FAPE under
the IDEA is received is before the court).
47. See id. at 999.
8
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adopt the higher standard advocated for by the plaintiffs.48  The Supreme
Court determined that the IDEA is more demanding than the “merely
more than de minimis” test applied by some circuits.49  Nevertheless, the
Court decided not to establish a particular test to evaluate the adequacy of
an IEP, instead holding that “a student offered an educational program
providing ‘merely more than de minimis’ progress from year to year can
hardly be said to have been offered an education at all.”50
C. Implementation vs. Content IEP Challenges
In both Endrew F. and Rowley, the Supreme Court had the task of de-
termining the appropriate standard for the content of an IEP under the
IDEA.51  In L.J., the Eleventh Circuit faced a slightly different challenge in
determining the standard for the implementation of an IEP.52  Guidance on
this question, though, remains limited as the Supreme Court did not ad-
dress it specifically in Endrew F. or Rowley.53
Though the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the requirements of
IEP implementation, some lower courts and legal scholars have provided
guidance on the interpretation of the IDEA when considering the imple-
mentation of an IEP.54  One approach for determining the adequacy of
IEP implementation is the “materiality standard,” which provides that the
party challenging the implementation of an IEP (1) must show more than
a de minimis failure to implement all elements of the IEP, and (2) must
demonstrate that the school failed to implement substantial or significant
provisions of the IEP.55
48. See id. at 998, 1000–01 (rejecting lower standard requiring “merely more
than de minimis” educational benefit employed by Tenth Circuit).
49. See id. at 1001 (holding that the lower standard is not in compliance with
the purpose of the IDEA).
50. See id. (declining to develop a specific test but reiterating that the lower
standard is not in compliance with the IDEA).
51. See id. at 997 (describing how the claim at issue arose from Endrew’s par-
ents challenging the content of the school district’s IEP proposal and refusal to
reimburse them for private school tuition and other associated costs); Bd. of Educ.
of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982)
(describing facts that lead to the plaintiff’s claim that the content of the student’s
IEP was inadequate to provide the student with a FAPE); see also Ferster, supra note
13, at 86 (explaining the difference between implementation IEP cases and con-
tent IEP cases).
52. See L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., 927 F.3d 1203, 1206–07
(11th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing this case from content IEP precedential cases and
identifying the relevant issue as whether the school district has effectively imple-
mented the IEP to provide a student with a disability with a FAPE).
53. For a further discussion of how Supreme Court precedent does not di-
rectly answer the question presented in L.J., see supra notes 49–51 and accompany-
ing text.
54. For a further discussion of how legal scholars have advocated for a differ-
ent approach than the one taken in L.J., see Section V.C, infra.
55. See L.J., 927 F.3d at 1213 (adopting the materiality standard, which asks
whether a school has failed to implement substantial or significant provisions of a
9
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Another option is the per se approach, which many legal scholars ad-
vocate for.56  Additionally, the dissenting opinion in Van Duyn ex rel. Van
Duyn v. Baker School District 5J 57 argued for this approach.58  The per se
approach provides that the definition of a FAPE in the IDEA calls for ser-
vices to be provided in conformity with the IEP, which requires schools to
implement all portions of the IEP, not just those deemed material.59  The
Second Circuit adopted a similar standard but did not call it the per se
approach.60  The decision of the Second Circuit held that mere “substan-
tial compliance” with an IEP does not meet the requirements of the IDEA
because the IDEA “requires compliance.”61
Since the Supreme Court decided Endrew F. in 2017, there have been
few challenges concerning a school district’s implementation of an IEP, let
alone cases that reach the circuit court level.62  Many of the cases in this
child’s IEP as a way to evaluate a school-provided FAPE); see also Houston Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000) (adopting the materiality
standard).  The Fifth Circuit concluded that to prevail on an implementation IEP
claim, the plaintiff must show more than a de minimis failure to implement the
IEP. See id; see also Perry A. Zirkel, The Third Dimension of FAPE Under the IDEA: IEP
Implementation, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 409, 414 (2016) (explaining
how the materiality standard has been adopted by some circuit courts in imple-
mentation IEP cases).
56. See Ferster, supra note 13, at 94–104 (analyzing different standards for
evaluating IEP implementation cases and concluding that the per se approach is
most consistent with the IDEA).
57. 502 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2007).
58. See, e.g., id. at 828–29 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (advocating for the per se
approach, as opposed to the materiality standard, by arguing that a school district’s
failure to comply with any measure of the IEP is a denial of a FAPE).
59. For complete analysis of the per se approach, see Section V.C, infra.
60. See D.D. ex rel. V.D. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 465 F.3d 503, 506–14 (2d Cir.
2006) (holding that the IDEA requires IEP implementation to be in complete
compliance with what is written).  This class action case dealt with preschool chil-
dren with disabilities, claiming that the New York City Department of Education
and the New York State Education Department violated the IDEA by not immedi-
ately providing students with disabilities with the services in their IEPs. See id.
61. See id. at 512 (indicating that what is required under the IDEA is complete
compliance with what is written in IEP).  The Second Circuit additionally rejected
the “substantial compliance” standard, contrasting it with the Supreme Court case
Blessing v. Freestone, which discussed “substantial compliance” in the context of So-
cial Security Act. See id. (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 328 (1997)).  The
court stated that the plaintiffs here are different from the plaintiffs in Blessing be-
cause the IDEA’s statutory language is clear that a FAPE is required. See id. See
generally Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343 (holding that “substantial compliance” was suffi-
cient for provision of Social Security Act because Title IV-D “was not intended to
benefit individual children and custodial parents” and did not create enforceable
federal right).
62. See L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 927 F.3d 1203, 1207
(11th Cir. 2019) (noting that the Supreme Court has yet to set a standard for
implementation cases, and that neither has the Eleventh Circuit); see also Ferster,
supra note 13, at 86–87 (stating that there have not been many IEP implementa-
tion challenges).  It is unlikely that students would concede that an IEP provided a
FAPE as written, because that would be giving up an argument in their IDEA chal-
10
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area of the law do not survive motions to dismiss or reach only administra-
tive law judges or mediators.63 L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. School Board of Broward
County,64 however, did reach the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.65 L.J.
presented an IEP implementation issue of whether the failure to imple-
ment any part of an IEP constituted a denial of a FAPE.66
III. CLASS SYLLABUS: THE FACTS OF L.J.
In L.J., the plaintiff, who was a disabled teenaged boy diagnosed with
autism spectrum disorder and a speech/language impairment, had been
identified as a student eligible to receive special education services under
the IDEA.67  L.J. received services throughout elementary and middle
school in the Broward County, Florida, public school system and had sev-
eral IEPs over his time in the school district.68  An IEP from August 2005
lenge, particularly when content IEP jurisprudence is a more developed area of
the law. See Ferster, supra note 13, at 86–87.
63. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2018) (requiring that any local educa-
tional agency or state that receives federal funding provides means to allow parties
to file claims and deal with disputes, particularly encouraging the use of media-
tion, rather than going directly to court); Jonathan A. Breyer, A Modest Proposal:
Mediating IDEA Disputes Without Splitting the Baby, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 37, 37–38 (1999)
(explaining that the 1997 amendments to the IDEA included a mediation provi-
sion for first time).  Mediation may be equipped to handle many of the disputes
presented, but it does provide some inconsistency and ambiguity in resolutions
across states and across local educational agencies due to the vagueness in the
IDEA itself. See Breyer, supra, at 37–38.
64. 927 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2019).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 1206.
67. See id. at 1208 (describing that L.J.’s school first identified him as a stu-
dent with a disability in elementary school). See generally What Is Autism?, AUTISM
SPEAKS, https://www.autismspeaks.org/what-autism [https://perma.cc/36XB-
JQ96] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (describing autism, or autism spectrum disorder
(ASD), as having a  broad range of conditions associated with social skills, sensory
sensitivities, repetitive behaviors, speech, and nonverbal communication).  The
Centers for Disease Control reports an estimate of one in fifty-nine children in the
United States are somewhere on the autism spectrum. See What Is Autism?, supra.
Autism presents many challenges to an individual from childhood to adulthood
due to differences in the ways that people with autism think, learn, and view the
world. See id.
68. See L.J., 927 F.3d at 1207–08 (noting that the IEP that remained in place
for the majority of L.J.’s educational career was one developed in his third-grade
year by his mother and an education professional from his elementary school). See
generally Autism Speaks Guide to Individualized Education Programs, AUTISM SPEAKS,
https://docs.autismspeaks.org/iep/cover/ [https://perma.cc/YY6N-YKRD] (last
visited Oct. 23, 2019) [hereinafter, Autism Speaks Guide] (giving advice to parents of
children with autism and school professionals about what should be included in an
autistic student’s IEP).  Students with autism have varying needs and the goals of
the IEP will change based on the child’s place on the autism spectrum. See id.
Generally, some types of services that will be included in an IEP for a student with
autism are support related to assistive technology, speech and language services,
psychological or mental health support, physical or occupational therapy, and so-
cial skills services. See id.
11
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placed L.J. in a large public middle school where he “immediately dis-
played a strong aversion” to attending school.69  His behavior became dis-
ruptive, resulting in three suspensions from school.70  As a result, his
mother N.N.J. decided to keep him at home and self-teach for the remain-
der of the school year.71
Following the 2005–2006 school year, N.N.J. challenged the content
of the school board’s 2005 IEP and filed a request for a due process hear-
ing with the State of Florida Department of Administrative Hearings.72
From the time that a due process hearing is requested until the proceed-
ings are completed, the IDEA requires schools to use the “stay-put” provi-
sion, which keeps in place the most recently agreed upon IEP (which in
this case was in 2002).73
After the due process hearing, the administrative law judge deter-
mined that the 2005 IEP provided L.J. with a FAPE, that the school board
adequately implemented the 2002 stay-put IEP during the pendency of the
review proceedings, and that certain services were not necessary for L.J. as
requested by N.N.J.74  L.J. returned to school for the 2006–2007 school
year, where his aversion to school and disruptive behavior continued.75
69. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1218 (explaining L.J.’s aversion to school once he started
middle school, where he strongly disliked the new setting and that his problematic
behaviors, including constant refusal to attend school, began immediately).
70. See id. at 1208.
71. See id. (describing L.J.’s mother’s decision to homeschool him for rest of
the year after L.J.’s problematic behavior in the middle school setting).  This
prompted L.J.’s mother to file the IDEA complaint challenging the content of the
newly proposed IEP by the IEP team in the middle school. See id.
72. See id. (describing five complaints over an eight-month period that went to
an administrative law judge, who consolidated complaints to review together); see
also 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2018) (establishing the right of parents of a child with a
disability to present a complaint “with respect to any matter relating to the identifi-
cation, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free
appropriate public education to such child” and the right to an “impartial due
process hearing,” as well as other procedural requirements).
73. See L.J., 927 F.3d at 1208 (describing facts of case surrounding the after-
math of N.N.J.’s filed complaint); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(j) (2018) (outlining the
“stay-put” provision).  The stay-put provision requires the maintenance of the cur-
rent educational placement during any pendency of proceedings. See § 1414(j); see
also Zirkel, supra note 34, at 554 (explaining the “stay-put” or “pendency” provision
of the IDEA as “fluid” and complicated concepts with little guidance from the
IDEA).  The primary purpose of the stay-put provision is to maintain the status quo
of the student’s educational services while disputes regarding the IEP are resolved.
See Zirkel, supra note 34, at 554.
74. See L.J., 927 F.3d at 1208 (describing the administrative law judge’s hold-
ing).  L.J.’s mother appealed the administrative law judge’s holding, but it was later
affirmed by a district court judge. See id. These claims are not at issue in the case
before the court. See id.
75. See id. (describing L.J.’s continued problematic behavior in his seventh-
grade year when he returned to public school).  L.J.’s behavioral problems in-
cluded frequent absences which, due to either illness or refusal to attend, caused
him to be absent for over 100 days—this meant he was present for less than a
quarter of his class periods during this school year. See id.
12
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Efforts to create a new IEP did not go as planned and, in December 2006,
N.N.J. filed a request for another due process hearing, claiming that the
school board failed to fully implement L.J.’s stay-put 2002 IEP during the
pendency of the previous review proceedings.76  N.N.J. claimed that the
school board failed to comply with the strategies laid out in the IEP in a
variety of incidents at school.77  After multiple appeals, Judge Errol H.
Powell issued a decision in October 2009 holding that the school board
violated the stay-put provisions of the IDEA by not adequately implement-
ing L.J.’s 2002 stay-put IEP during the pendency of the review proceedings
and, thus, failed to provide L.J. with a FAPE.78  The judge applied the
“material failure standard” and concluded, after comparing the terms of
the 2002 IEP to the services provided by the school board during that stay-
put time period, that N.N.J. successfully demonstrated more than minor
discrepancies in the implementation of the IEP.79  The district court re-
versed this decision and held that the school board did not fail to imple-
ment the stay-put 2002 IEP.80
76. See id. at 1209 (explaining challenge that eventually led to the appeal).
L.J.’s mother claimed that the school district did not adequately implement the
stay-put IEP in the beginning of L.J.’s seventh grade year. See id.
77. See L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 2017 WL 6597516, at
*21–23 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2017), aff’d, 927 F.3d 1203 (2019) (describing incidents
that gave rise to claim by student’s mother that school district did not properly
implement student’s stay-put IEP).  Those incidents include times when teachers
used negative language with the student, instead of positive language like IEP de-
mands. See id.  Another incident occurred when the student was disruptive and
violent in class and school employees gave him candy to stop instead of using the
methods described in the IEP, which involve not rewarding bad behavior. See id. at
*22.  Finally, a school employee failed to use a social story in an incident, as out-
lined in the IEP, that may have prevented the student from reacting negatively to
having to use a bathroom he did not prefer. See id. at *21.
78. See id. at *3 (describing claim in case).  There were multiple administra-
tive challenges, continued problems for L.J. at school, and his mother eventually
removed him from the public school about halfway through his eighth-grade year.
See id.
79. See id. (explaining administrative law judge’s holding that there were ma-
terial provisions of the IEP that were not implemented by school).  The claim re-
quired eighteen non-consecutive days of hearings and the administrative law judge
also determined that “the school had discriminated and retaliated against L.J. and
his mother for exercising their rights under the IDEA.” See L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Sch.
Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 927 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir. 2019).
80. See L.J., 927 F.3d at 1210 (explaining district court’s reversal of administra-
tive law judge’s decision in favor of student).  The district court entered a judg-
ment in favor of the school district. See id.  L.J.’s mother appealed this decision,
bringing it before the Eleventh Circuit. See id.; see also L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Sch. Bd.
of Broward Cty., Fla., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1325–26 (S.D. Fla. 2012), aff’d, 927
F.3d 1203 (reversing the administrative law judge’s determination that it deprived
L.J. of a FAPE by applying the materiality standard and identifying that evidence
did not support conclusion that there was an implementation failure on the part of
the school district).
13
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IV. SAVED BY THE BELL: A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF L.J.
The issue before the Eleventh Circuit in L.J. was whether the school
board deprived L.J. of a FAPE as guaranteed under the IDEA by failing to
adequately implement the student’s IEP.81  To address this issue, the Elev-
enth Circuit began its analysis by deeming this case an “implementation”
IEP case.82  After determining the type of issue presented, the court de-
cided to adopt the materiality standard and applied it to the facts
presented.83
A. Implementation IEP Case Determination
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by explaining the difference
between content IEP cases and implementation IEP cases.84  Here, the
court  distinguished L.J. from both Rowley and Endrew F. because those
cases concerned an IEP’s content and how an IEP “as written” may fail to
offer a FAPE.85  The Eleventh Circuit determined here, though, that the
question in L.J. revolved around the implementation of an IEP, rather
than its written content because “even where an IEP as written may satisfy
the IDEA, schools can also fail to meet their obligation to prove a [FAPE]
by failing to implement the IEP in practice.”86  Because the court deter-
mined that this case concerned implementation of the IEP rather than its
content, it then stated that the standard articulated in Endrew F. does not
apply and, therefore, there was no binding precedent on the issue
presented in L.J.87
81. See L.J., 927 F.3d at 1203 (describing issue of case as being a new issue to
the Eleventh Circuit).  The Eleventh Circuit described this case as unlike Endrew F.
because it dealt with implementation of the IEP rather than the written content.
See id.
82. For a further discussion of the Eleventh Circuit’s determination that this
case was an IEP implementation case, see Section III.A, infra.
83. For a full discussion of the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption and application of
the materiality standard, see Section III.B, infra.
84. See id. at 1210–11 (discussing difference between IEP content cases and
implementation IEP cases).  For further discussion of the difference between con-
tent and implementation IEP cases, see supra note 14.
85. See id. at 1211 (distinguishing from Rowley and Endrew F. because those
cases provide guidelines for IEP content claims). See generally Endrew F. v. Douglas
Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 996–97 (2017) (explaining the school board did not
update Endrew F’s IEP when his parents believed his progress stalled and his be-
havior was not improving); Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist.
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982) (explaining the alleged issue with the IEP as
written was that it did not provide for a sign language interpreter despite the par-
ents’ request for one).
86. L.J., 927 F.2d at 1211.
87. See id. (identifying this issue as one of first impression for the Eleventh
Circuit).  The Eleventh Circuit distinguished this case from Endrew F., noting that
Endrew F.’s content IEP holding did not apply to this implentation IEP case. See id.
14
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B. Adoption of the Materiality Standard
The Eleventh Circuit then determined the appropriate standard of
review.88  In doing so, the court adopted the materiality standard, stating
that “to prevail in a failure-to-implement case, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the school has materially failed to implement a child’s IEP.”89  To
clarify, the plaintiff must prove more than a minor or technical gap be-
tween the IEP and reality of implementation.90  The court here stated that
a school materially fails to implement an IEP when it does not incorporate
“substantial or significant provisions” into the student’s education.91  In
adopting the materiality standard, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a standard
that would hold that any deviation from the IEP violates the IDEA.92
C. Application of Materiality Standard
After adopting the materiality standard, the court applied it to the
facts of L.J.93  Here, the court found there was no material failure to im-
plement L.J.’s IEP.94  First, the Eleventh Circuit stated that many of the
administrative law judge’s conclusions were not supported in the record or
failed to tie the alleged failure to a provision in the stay-put IEP.95  Fur-
ther, in the court’s eyes, other alleged implementation failures “reflected
simple disagreements between L.J.’s mother and the school about how to
provide the services described in the IEP.”96  Moreover, the court attrib-
88. See id. at 1211 (explaining the need to establish a standard of review be-
cause there was no binding precedent to provide guidance on the implementation
issue).
89. Id. (establishing materiality standard).  For further discussion of the mate-
riality standard, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
90. See id. (establishing burden of proof for plaintiff under materiality stan-
dard as needing to prove more than de minimis failure in implementation of IEP).
Proving more than a de minimis failure means that a small deviation from the IEP
is not unlawful under the IDEA. See id.  The court further explained that “[a]
material implementation failure occurs only when a school has failed to imple-
ment substantial or significant provisions of a child’s IEP.” Id. A “minor” gap in
IEP implementation, as outlined by the Ninth Circuit in the Van Duyn case, is “if
the child performed at or above the anticipated level, that would tend to show that
the shortfall in instruction was not material.” See Van Dyun ex rel. Van Dyun v.
Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2007).  The Eleventh Circuit in L.J.
largely relied on the analysis by the Ninth Circuit in Van Duyn in the adoption of
the materiality standard. See L.J., 927 F.3d at 1211–13.
91. See id. (defining the materiality standard).
92. See id. at 1213 (rejecting the per se approach).  For a further discussion of
the per se approach, see Section V.C, infra
93. See id. at 1216–17 (analyzing and disagreeing with the administrative law
judge’s analysis that previously laid the fault with the school for the shortfalls in
the L.J.’s speech and occupational therapy).  Here, the Eleventh Circuit stated that
these shortfalls by the school were “relatively minor after factoring out the missed
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uted the IEP services L.J. missed to his absence from school and found
that L.J.’s struggles were not a result of a material IEP implementation
failure.97  Overall, the court affirmed the district court’s decision that the
school board did not materially fail to implement L.J.’s IEP.98
V. INCOMPLETE ASSIGNMENTS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF L.J.
The adoption of the materiality standard in L.J. is not consistent with
Supreme Court precedent, the purpose of the IDEA, and the procedural
requirements of the IDEA.99  As the main tool through which the legisla-
tion provides a FAPE to students with disabilities, providing parents the
right to challenge only those IEP provisions deemed “material” denies stu-
dents the promises of the IDEA.100  The per se approach, on the other
hand, requires the complete implementation of an IEP and conforms with
both Supreme Court precedent and the goals of the IDEA.101
A. Materiality Standard’s Inconsistency with Supreme Court Precedent and the
Court’s Role in the IEP Process
In Endrew F., the Supreme Court specifically rejected a lower standard
for IEP content cases, which would have stated that compliance with the
IDEA’s requirement of a FAPE merely called for a de minimis educational
benefit conferred for students with disabilities.102  The materiality stan-
dard the L.J. Court applied to IEP implementation mirrors the de minimis
standard rejected by the Court in Endrew F.103  In L.J., the Eleventh Circuit
defended its conclusion and claimed that it was “keeping with the Su-
preme Court’s example in Endrew F.” when it refused to lay out every detail
of the test in order to account for each student’s differences and allow IEP
97. See id. at 1217–20.
98. See id. at 1220.  The Eleventh Circuit determined that there was not a
material failure in the implementation of the IEP on the part of the school district,
and thus, L.J. was not denied a FAPE as guaranteed under the IDEA. See id.
99. For a complete critical analysis of the materiality standard’s inconsistency
with Supreme Court precedent and the IDEA, see Part V, infra.
100. For a full discussion of why the materiality standard denies the promises
of the IDEA to students with disabilities, see Section V.B, infra.
101. For complete discussion of why the per se approach is more consistent
than the materiality approach with the IDEA and Supreme Court precedent, see
Section V.C, infra.
102. See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (2017)
(explaining how the Supreme Court rejected the de minimis standard put forth by
Tenth Circuit); see also Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 129 (arguing that the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Endrew F. caused the demise of the de minimis
standard).
103. See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (explaining how the Supreme Court
rejected the lower de minimis standard used  by Tenth Circuit); see also L.J., 927
F.2d at 1211 (establishing the materiality standard); Zirkel supra note 34, at 551
(stating that even though the exact effect of Endrew F. remains to be seen, many
advocates viewed the decision as elevating a substantive standard for a FAPE).
16
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evaluation on a factual basis.104  Though the Supreme Court declined to
elaborate on its standard in Endrew F., the Court did state that “this ab-
sence of a bright-line rule, however, should not be mistaken for ‘an invita-
tion to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational
policy for those of the school authorities which they review.’”105
Notably, the true spirit of the Endrew F. decision does not lie in the
Court’s reluctance to craft a particular step-by-step formula to determine
the effectiveness of an IEP.106  Rather, the Endrew F. Court was far more
concerned with striking down an interpretation of FAPE that led to
schools providing students with disabilities an education that could barely
be considered an education at all.107  If the Eleventh Circuit truly meant
to reach a holding consistent with the principles of Endrew F., the court
should not have emphasized the lack of a specific standard and should
104. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1214 (explaining how the materiality standard is consis-
tent with Supreme Court precedent because the Court declined in Endrew F. to lay
out a detailed test for evaluation of the content of an IEP in order to account for
differences among children and how one test may not work in every circum-
stance); see Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (declining to elaborate on what “appropri-
ate” progress looks like in order to give some flexibility on case to case basis).  The
Supreme Court noted here that each child’s needs are different, and it is impor-
tant to defer to schools because they have expertise in dealing with decisions about
students and education in general. See id.
105. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson
Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)) (clarifying that the lack of
specifics in the Court’s test for FAPE does not give courts power to decide the
meaning of a FAPE for themselves); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206 (1982) (explain-
ing that courts evaluating an IEP must keep in mind the procedural requirements
of the IDEA in preparation of the IEP and to be careful not to frustrate those by
establishing their own standards of review).
106. See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999 (holding that “a school must offer an IEP
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of
the child’s circumstances”).  This is not a very specific standard but is higher than
“some” educational benefit. See id.; see also Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 130
(arguing that Endrew F. raised the bar for the amount of educational benefit
schools need to provide students with disabilities in order to comply with the
IDEA).  The Endrew F. Court’s standard attempts to be consistent with the IDEA’s
idea of focusing on the particular child and their unique and individual needs. See
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
107. See id. at 1001 (“[A] student offered an educational program providing
‘merely more than de minimis’ progress from year to year can hardly be said to have
been offered an education at all.”); see also Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 130–37
(arguing that the Supreme Court created a higher standard for evaluating whether
an IEP provided a FAPE for a student with a disability).  During oral arguments,
the Justices were looking for a standard with some teeth and called the Endrew F.
decision a “victory for students with disabilities and their parents.” See Conroy &
Yell, supra note 40, at 130; see also Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Grapple with
Proper Standard for Measuring Educational Benefits for Children with Disabilities,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/argument-
analysis-justices-grapple-proper-standard-measuring-educational-benefits-children-
disabilities [https://perma.cc/7CZE-GX3R] (quoting Justices Kagan and Ginsburg
during oral arguments for Endrew F., stating that both were in favor of adopting “a
standard with a bite”).
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have instead focused on the level of educational benefit derived from the
implementation of the IEP.108
Many experts theorize that the Endrew F. decision intended to raise
the bar for school districts when educating students with disabilities by
elevating the substantive standard for a FAPE.109  The Endrew F. Court ac-
knowledged that progress for each student with a disability would not look
the same, but demanded that each student’s IEP be “appropriately ambi-
tious in light of his circumstances,” and even though the IEP’s goals may
differ, “every child should have the chance to meet challenging objec-
tives.”110  Consequently, the materiality standard applied in L.J. does not
conform with these values found in Endrew F. and does not further the
Supreme Court’s goals set forth in that decision.111
In fact, the materiality standard looks more like the de minimis stan-
dard the Supreme Court rejected in Endrew F.112  The de minimis, or the
“some educational benefit” standard, and the materiality standard are sim-
ilarly situated because they require less of the school district than the con-
formity required by the IDEA, while providing students with disabilities
less than what the IDEA promises.113  The materiality standard also places
108. See Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 129–31 (emphasizing importance of
the Supreme Court rejecting the de minimis standard).  For a further discussion of
the reasoning and holding of L.J., see supra notes 88–98 and accompanying text.
The Endrew F. decision is significant because it raised the educational benefit bar.
See Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 129–31.
109. See id. (describing that many legal scholars found that the Endrew F. deci-
sion holds schools to a higher standard than previously required in order to pro-
vide a FAPE).  The legacy of Endrew F. is uncertain because it will be left up to the
school districts to implement this standard and up to lower courts and administra-
tive law judges to interpret the standard when cases and complaints inevitably
arise. See id.
110. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000 (describing how the standard the Court
applied for determining whether a FAPE is met is appropriate for evaluation of
IEP claims under the IDEA because the IDEA focuses so heavily on individuality
and the uniqueness of each child).  The IDEA acknowledges that it is vital to the
success of the legislation to recognize the different needs in children with disabili-
ties. See id.
111. See id. at 1001 (holding that the lower de minimis standard is not in
compliance with the IDEA because it does not ensure students with a FAPE); see
also Ferster, supra note 13, at 87–91, 103–04 (analyzing the materiality standard
and determining that it does not convey the appropriate level of educational bene-
fit to students with disabilities in order to comply with the IDEA).  The materiality
standard does not provide students with a FAPE because if implementation is not
“in conformity” with an IEP, then it is not meeting the requirements of the IDEA.
See generally Ferster, supra note 13, at 87–91, 103–04.
112. See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (rejecting “some benefit” or de minimis
educational benefit standard as not complying with the IDEA); see also Ferster,
supra note 13, at 103 (suggesting that the per se standard is consistent with the
purpose of the IDEA, while the materiality standard is not because it does not
further the goal of providing a FAPE to students with disabilities).
113. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2018) (promising to students with disabilities a
FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and
independent living”); see also Ferster, supra note 13, at 103 (arguing that the mate-
18
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the burden on the child to prove any material failures in the implementa-
tion of the IEP, while removing responsibility from the school district to
ensure that the special education services comply with the IEP.114  The
Endrew F. decision did not intend to remove accountability from the
school district and place more responsibility on the students with disabili-
ties.115  Instead, a more accurate reading of Endrew F. signals that the Su-
preme Court intended to hold schools accountable for the promises of the
IDEA and will not accept such low standards for the education provided to
students with disabilities.116  If the Supreme Court demanded more than
“some” educational benefit in the written content of IEPs, it is fair to say
that it would require more than “material” implementation of said
IEPs.117  In light of the Endrew F. decision, the materiality standard as used
riality standard does not comply with promises of the IDEA).  The per se approach
is more consistent with these promises. See id.
114. See Matthew Scott Weiner, Material Failure and IEP Implementation: How the
Ninth Circuit Pulled the Teeth out of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 39 SW.
L. REV. 541, 559–67 (2010) (arguing that the materiality standard places the bur-
den of proving that the school materially failed to implement an IEP on students
and parents).  Placing the burden of proving the school’s material failure in IEP
implementation on the disabled students and their parents is not required by the
IDEA and it actually frustrates the goals of the IDEA, which are to protect students
with disabilities while also putting parents and children “in a precarious position”
as it is difficult for these individuals to determine whether a failure is “material.”
See id.
115. See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999–1001 (warning that this decision should
not be construed as letting schools ignore their obligations under the IDEA).  The
Court stated that “[t]he ‘reasonably calculated’ qualification reflects a recognition
that crafting an appropriate program of education requires prospective judgment
by school officials.” Id. at 999 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent.
Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 209 (1982)).  The Court also called the IDEA an
“ambitious piece of legislation.” Id.  Additionally, the Court stated that “it cannot
be the case that the Act typically aims for grade-level advancement for children
with disabilities who can be educated in the regular classroom, but is satisfied with
barely more than de minimis progress for those who cannot.” Id. at 1001–02.  The
Court also claimed that “[t]he Act vests these [school] officials with responsibility
for decisions of critical importance to the life of a disabled child.” Id. at 1001.
Nothing in the Endrew F. opinion lends itself to holding schools less accountable—
in fact, the decision seems to reflect the idea that school officials stand as an in-
credibly important party in fulfilling the promises of the IDEA. See id. at 999–1001.
116. See supra note 114; see also Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 130 (“The
Supreme Court’s new standard is undoubtedly higher than the de minimis educa-
tional benefit standard.”)  The Supreme Court intends to hold schools accounta-
ble to this higher standard. See Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 130.
117. See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000–01 (rejecting some benefit standard by
arguing that “the IDEA demands more”).  The Court indicated that it will not
stand for less than the promises made in the IDEA to students with disabilities. See
id.  Additionally, the Court’s tone in the opinion appears very disapproving of the
Tenth Circuit’s analysis, which conveyed a concern for ensuring that schools take
the IDEA, particularly the IEP process, very seriously. See id.  Another indication
that the Court felt this way is the unanimity of the decision—a unanimous Su-
preme Court opinion sends a message. See id; see also Adam Feldman, Empirical
SCOTUS: Amid Record-Breaking Consensus, the Justices’ Divisions Still Run Deep,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/02/empirical-
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in the Eleventh Circuit’s holding is inappropriate and does not promote
Endrew F.’s underlying principles.118
Not only is the materiality standard inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent, but it also creates an issue involving judicial interpretation.119
The materiality standard requires the court to determine what is “mate-
rial” in an IEP, but this distinction is unnecessary as everything in the IEP
has already been deemed material by the IEP team.120  A provision in the
final version of an IEP has gone through many steps and deliberation to
get there and, thus, must be substantially important to the education of
the student.121  As previously stated, the IDEA sets forth procedural re-
quirements and specific steps that the IEP team must take in order to craft
an IEP, which will be discussed infra.122
The members of the IEP team have deliberated each provision placed
in the plan, deeming each provision important enough to include in the
IEP.123  Not only did the IEP team determine that each provision is impor-
tant, but it must have determined that each provision was vital to provid-
scotus-amid-record-breaking-consensus-the-justices-divisions-still-run-deep/ (stat-
ing “the importance of unanimity in providing a gloss of legitimacy to the Supreme
Court’s decisions.”); see also Conroy & Yell, supra note 40, at 132 (stating that En-
drew F. raises the bar for level of educational benefit for students with disabilities).
118. For further discussion about what the Endrew F. opinion accomplished,
see supra notes 109–111 and accompanying text (supporting that Endrew F. in-
tended to raise bar for level of educational benefit for students with disabilities, to
hold schools accountable for promises made in the IDEA, to focus on individual
child to help them make appropriate progress, and to show how seriously the
Court takes the IDEA).
119. See Jeffrey A. Knight, When Close Enough Doesn’t Cut It: Why Courts Should
Want to Steer Clear of Determining What Is—and What Is Not—Material in a Child’s
Individual Education Program, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 375, 409 (2010) (arguing that
“[b]y engaging in a debate over whether a provision of an IEP is material, the
court necessarily adds judges to the list of members of the IEP team”).  Requiring
judges to determine materiality is not included in the IDEA and adds another layer
of complication to the determination of whether the IEP implementation was suffi-
cient to provide a FAPE. See id.
120. See id. (claiming that everything present in IEP has already been deemed
material by the IEP team).  Allowing courts to deem portions of the IEP immaterial
grants undue authority over what is not a power vested in the judiciary. See generally
id.
121. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2018) (setting forth the requirements for the
development of IEP, mandating that it be developed by the entire IEP team, with
considerations to many different factors); see also Knight, supra note 119, at 409
(stating that the IEP process is long and includes much discussion from the IEP
team).  If a provision was significant enough to make it into the final cut of the
IEP, then it must be material. See id.  Judges do not need to be engaging in this
discussion. See id.
122. See Section V.B, infra, for a further discussion of the procedural require-
ments of the IDEA and how the materiality standard does not comply with them.
123. See infra notes 139–140 for a further discussion about how each provision
placed in the IEP is material after the process that it went through to make it into
the final version of the student’s IEP.
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ing the student with a FAPE.124  As one legal commentator notes, an “IEP,
in its final form, is the document designed to deliver the education neces-
sary to bring the child on a par with her peers.”125  If a provision has made
it into the final version of a child’s IEP, it means it was important enough
for the student’s education, and is therefore material.126  At this stage, the
courts should not engage in debate over what they consider material when
the actual content of the IEP is not in question.127
B. The Materiality Standard Is Inconsistent with the IDEA
Beyond L.J.’s inconsistency with Supreme Court precedent, the deci-
sion does not comply with the requirements and purpose of the IDEA.128
The IDEA requires that the special education services be provided “in con-
formity with” the IEP in order to provide a FAPE.129  The materiality stan-
dard is inconsistent with the IDEA’s requirement of a FAPE as provided
through an IEP, and it also undermines the procedural protections of the
IDEA.130
124. See infra notes 139–140 for a further discussion about the importance of
each provision in the IEP; see also infra notes 129–130 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing link between requirement of a FAPE and requirement that services pro-
vided be “in conformity with” the IDEA).  It is clear that a FAPE is directly related
to complete compliance with the IEP because the IEP team deemed these services
necessary to provide the student with a disability a FAPE. See Knight, supra note
119, at 409 (noting that the “IDEA was designed to afford a certain level of flexibil-
ity to schools, administrators, and teachers alike, and given the extensive proce-
dures for revising or amending an IEP, there should be no reason for school
officials to alter the document without the consent of the parents and the rest of
the IEP team”).
125. See Knight, supra note 119, at 407.
126. For a full discussion about the IEP process and how significant each pro-
vision is in the final version of the IEP, see infra notes 138–142 and accompanying
text.
127. See Knight, supra note 119, at 409 (arguing that if an IEP has reached this
stage, where challenge relates to implementation and not content of IEP, then
courts should accept that every provision in the IEP is material).  The courts
should not be engaging in discussion that has essentially has already been had by
the IEP team when developing the IEP. See id.
128. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(d) (2018) (requiring that schools offer students
with disabilities a FAPE “in conformity” with the IEP); see also Ferster, supra note
13, at 103 (arguing that the IDEA requires complete conformity with IEP and any
deviation from the content of an IEP in implementation violates the IDEA’s proce-
dural requirements).  The IDEA’s extensive procedural protections attempt “to en-
sure that parents and students fully participate in the development of IEPs.” See
Ferster, supra note 13, at 103.
129. See id. (identifying struggle that courts, schools, and legal scholars have
had over what “in conformity with” means).  While some believe that the IDEA
requirement means that schools must provide complete conformity with the IEP,
others believe that substantial conformity with the IEP is sufficient. See Ferster,
supra note 13, at 103.
130. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(3)(F) (2018) (requiring, as part of procedural
protections, that changes to the IEP must be made by the entire IEP team with few
exceptions); see also Ferster, supra note 13, at 99 (describing procedural protec-
tions of the IDEA as heavily emphasized for the protection of students and parents
21
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The provision in the IDEA requiring implementation to be “in con-
formity with” the IEP is not a suggestion.131  Nevertheless, the materiality
standard ignores the IDEA’s conformity language.132  The full section in
the IDEA reads: “[t]he term ‘free appropriate public education’ means
special education and related services that . . . are provided in conformity
with the individualized education program under section 1414(d) of this
title.”133  The word “conformity” means “exact correspondence to or with a
pattern,” as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary.134  Congress chose the
word “conformity” to describe the requirements of IEP implementa-
tion.135  The materiality standard, as articulated in L.J., disregards this
term in the IDEA, but this cannot be what Congress intended when draft-
ing this legislation.136
in the IEP process).  The implementation of the IEP is another one of those proce-
dural elements. See id.
131. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D) (2018) (providing that a FAPE will be pro-
vided through special education and related services “in conformity with the indi-
vidualized education program”).
132. See L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 927 F.3d 1203, 1216
(11th Cir. 2019) (mentioning briefly the IDEA’s requirement that the education
provided should be “in conformity with” the IEP but not analyzing further).  This
suggests that the Eleventh Circuit did not find this language important enough—
even though it is an important provision in the IDEA about IEP implementation—
or it did not want to have to grapple with the implications of this language. See id.
133. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D) (2018); see also Weiner, supra note 114, at 557
(stating the IDEA’s conformity provision in order to make the point that demand-
ing that services be provided “in conformity with” IEP is directly tied to the re-
quirement of a FAPE).
134. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 717 (2d. ed. 1989) (providing defini-
tion of “conformity”); see also Weiner, supra note 114, at 557 (quoting Oxford En-
glish Dictionary’s definition of “conformity” to point out that “conformity” means
“exact”).  A legal commentator notes that the Van Dyun opinion is “engaging in a
desperate game of semantics to support an unsupportable position” when using
the materiality standard in the analysis of an implementation IEP case. See Weiner,
supra note 114, at 557. See generally Van Dyun ex rel. Van Dyun v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J,
502 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2007).
135. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D) (2018) (stating that a FAPE is provided
through special education services “in conformity with” the IEP).  According to the
“plain meaning” rule of statutory interpretation, words should be interpreted to
mean their “ordinarily accepted sense.” See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and
Change in Statutory Language, 67 NYU L. REV. 921, 932–33 (1992).  This means that
conformity should be taken to mean its ordinary definition of the word.  Addition-
ally, according to the inclusio unis maxim of statutory construction, “statutes should
not be casually construed to mandate changes not specified by the language cho-
sen.” See id. at 928.  Congress meant what was written and that if it had wanted IEP
implementation to be “materially” close, then it would have written that.  Statutory
language is important and cannot be disregarded simply to make the argument for
the materiality standard easier.
136. Even in the preliminary stages of adopting the IDEA’s predecessor, the
EHA, drafters noted the importance of procedures in order “to protect the rights
of handicapped children and their parents,” suggesting the importance of lan-
guage in the procedural requirements. See 120 Cong. Rec. 15,271 (1974).  For
further discussion of how the language in the statute does not indicate that the
22
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Not only does the materiality standard neglect to address specific pro-
visions of the IDEA, but it also undermines important portions of the
IDEA’s procedural requirements.137  By allowing for a flexible implemen-
tation of IEPs, the materiality standard gives schools the unilateral power
to make changes to the IEP when failing to implement the entire IEP.138
Even though an entire team of parents and school experts create the IEP,
teachers and administrators ultimately have the power over a student’s ed-
ucation on a daily basis—leaving the student and parents vulnerable to the
school to correctly implement the plan.139  The creation of the IEP then
acts as an important procedural requirement under the IDEA that ensures
both the parents and school leaders have a say in determining what is best
for the child.140
materiality standard approach would be appropriate in evaluating IEP implemen-
tation cases, see Section V.B, infra.
137. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(3)(F) (2018) (providing some of the IDEA’s pro-
cedural requirements).  These procedural requirements include “[c]hanges to the
IEP may be made either by the entire IEP Team or, as provided in subparagraph
(D), by amending the IEP rather than by redrafting the entire IEP.  Upon request,
a parent shall be provided with a revised copy of the IEP with the amendments
incorporated.” See id.; see also § 1415 (outlining “[p]rocedural [s]afeguards” of the
IDEA which extensively protect rights and interests of children with disabilities and
their parents); Ferster, supra note 13, at 99 (demonstrating how important proce-
dural protections are to the IDEA’s purpose).  Importantly, the IDEA’s procedural
protections are a “stricter standard for IEP implementation” than those required
by the materiality standard. See Ferster, supra note 13, at 99.
138. See Van Dyun, 502 F.3d at 827–28 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the materiality standard gives schools unilateral power to change IEPs, which un-
dercuts procedural requirements of the IDEA because IEP creation is an “exten-
sive process” and involves an entire team, including parents and other educational
experts); see also Ferster, supra note 13, at 97–100 (arguing that the materiality
standard allows schools to exert more power to change IEPs than what the IDEA
provides).  Even though the IEP team creates the IEP, teachers and administrators
have “ultimate control” over what actually finds its way into the IEP because they
know and understand the modifications and accommodations available. See Fer-
ster, supra note 13, at 97.  This provides all the more reason to hold them account-
able for the content in the IEP. See id.  Additionally, “parents occasionally request
additional or different services from those included in the draft IEP, but those
services will only be included in the IEP if the school consents to them.” Id. at
97–98.  This suggests that a school’s argument that complete compliance with what
is written in the IEP is too burdensome for the school, either financially or other-
wise, is not justified, because if they did not have resources to provide certain ser-
vices to the student with a disability, then they would not have agreed to it when
writing the IEP. See id. at 97–100.
139. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(B) (2018) (requiring that IEP teams consist of
parents of students, a number of students’ teachers, including regular education
teachers and special education teachers, representatives of schools, different ex-
perts when necessary, and sometimes children themselves); see also id.
§ 1414(c)(3)(F) (laying out the procedural requirements in the IDEA for chang-
ing an IEP).
140. See supra notes 127–130 (supporting argument that materiality standard
is not consistent with procedural requirements of the IDEA and that it actually
undermines those requirements).  Because the school district took an active role
in crafting the IEP, it should not later take issue with implementation of that IEP.
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In writing the IEP, the IEP team made decisions based on an implicit
definition of a FAPE for that particular child.141  Allowing the school to
disregard a piece of the IEP undercuts the procedural protections pro-
vided by the IDEA, which the IEP team crafted to provide the most appro-
priate educational services to the  student.142  As the dissent in Ninth
Circuit case Van Dyun ex rel. Van Dyun v. Baker School District 5J 143 stated, a
school’s ability to ignore portions of the IEP would “essentially give the
district license to unilaterally redefine the content of the student’s plan by
default.”144  This license undermines the collaborative nature of the IEP
team and ignores the parental participation provisions of the IDEA.”145
Giving schools the power to not implement the entire IEP as written and
only hold the school district responsible for “material” failures directly
contradicts the purpose of the IDEA.146
C. The Per Se Approach Makes the Grade
The per se approach is the most consistent approach with both the
purpose and procedure of the IDEA, as well as Supreme Court precedent,
because it ensures that each student with a disability gains a meaningful
educational benefit from their IEP.147  As one commentator describes it,
If the school district has concerns with how to implement an IEP, it should raise
those concerns during the creation process. See id.
141. For a further discussion on how the FAPE requirement is tied to the IEP
implementation conformity requirement, see supra notes 129–130 and accompany-
ing text.
142. See Ferster, supra note 13, at 97–99, 103 (arguing that the procedural
requirements of the IDEA in the IEP process protect children and parents, that
the materiality standard undermines this process, and stating that the “IDEA’s em-
phasis on procedure seeks to ensure that parents and students fully participate in
the development of IEPs”).  For a further discussion of the procedural require-
ments of the IDEA, see supra notes 137–140 and accompanying text.
143. 502 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2007).
144. See id. at 828 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (emphasizing unilateral power
conferred in district by materiality standard).
145. See id. at 828–29 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the materiality
standard gives schools too much unilateral power in making decisions that are not
mandated under the IDEA).  Providing schools with this unilateral power under-
cuts procedural provisions of the statute as well as its purpose—to encourage coop-
eration between parents and schools in the decision-making process when it comes
to students with disabilities. See id.
146. See Ferster, supra note 13, at 99 (citing Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v.
Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2007)) (reiterating Van Dyun dissent’s
argument that the per se approach should be utilized).  The implementation of
the IEP is a crucial procedural requirement of the IDEA, and school districts
should not be allowed to effectively change the content by failing to implement
the full plan. See id.
147. See Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 828–29 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (arguing for
the per se approach by stating “an IEP is the product of an extensive process and
represents the reasoned conclusion of the IEP Team that the specific measures it
requires are necessary for the student to receive a [FAPE]. . . .  A school district’s
failure to comply with the specific measures in an IEP to which it has assented is,
by definition, a denial of FAPE . . . .”); see also Ferster, supra note 13, at 103 (sug-
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the per se approach as applied to implementation challenges considers “a
failure to implement any portion of the IEP” as a denial of a FAPE.148
As stated supra, the IDEA requires that the special education services
be provided “in conformity with” the IEP.149  The per se approach reflects
the IDEA’s requirements because it mandates the implementation of the
entire IEP, not just what is deemed “material.”150  As the Second Circuit
held in D.D. ex rel. V.D. v. New York City Board of Education,151 the “IDEA
does not simply require substantial compliance; . . . it requires compli-
ance.”152  Though this court did not name the per se approach in its hold-
ing, it advanced the same idea that the IDEA demands a mirror image of
the IEP’s written content and the IEP’s implementation to provide a stu-
dent with a disability with a FAPE.153
gesting that the per se standard is consistent with the IDEA because it ensures that
each disabled student is provided with a FAPE).  The per se approach is also in line
with the procedural requirements of the IDEA. See Ferster, supra note 13, at 103.
Adopting the per se standard reaffirms the idea that all of the IEP must be imple-
mented in schools. See id.  School officials still reserve the right to decide what an
appropriate education is and determine any potential financial burden. See id.
The implementation of the IEP, however, is not the place for that discussion, and
it should have been decided before arriving at this stage in the IEP process. See id.
148. See Ferster, supra note 13, at 91–92 (describing how any failure in imple-
mentation constitutes denial of a FAPE to student with disability).  When asked the
question “How much of an IEP do you have to implement?” at a special education
conference, a few hundred special education administrators answered, “all of it.”
See id.  This indicates that experts in the field believe that complete compliance
with the IEP in implementation is necessary. See id.
149. For a discussion of the IDEA’s conformity requirement for services pro-
vided in accordance with the IEP, see supra notes 140–142 and accompanying text.
150. See Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 828–29 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
schools have to implement all portions of the IEP in order to comply with the
IDEA); see also Ferster, supra note 13, at 95 (reiterating Van Duyn  court’s analysis
and arguing that the per se approach is most consistent with the IDEA by requiring
complete implementation of the IDEA).  The materiality standard is also disfa-
vored in some administrative decisions. See Ferster, supra note 13, at 95 (noting
that not many administrative decisions do not favor the materiality standard be-
cause they have decided that the IDEA calls for implementation “in conformity
with” an IEP, arguing that this standard is not “universally accepted” and making
the argument that the per se approach is best way to analyze these cases).  For a
more thorough analysis of the conformity requirement, see supra notes 129–142
and accompanying text.
151. 465 F.3d 503 (2d Cir. 2006).
152. See id. at 512 (explaining “substantial compliance” with the terms of the
IEP does not meet the standards of the IDEA and that the IDEA demands more
because it mandates “conformity” and has strict procedural requirements).
153. See id. (holding that IEP implementation must be in complete compli-
ance with the content of the IEP).  The Second Circuit did not directly adopt the
per se approach here, but its reasoning and holding is consistent with the main
ideas of the per se approach and serves as a good example of how to apply the
standard. See id.; see also Ferster, supra note 13, at 92–93 (indicating that D.D. cor-
rectly applies per se approach, even if court does not directly name standard used
(citing D.D., 465 F.3d at 510–12).
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Further, the dissenting opinion in Van Dyun articulates one of the
best arguments for the use of the per se approach.154  The dissenting
judge states:
[A]n IEP is the product of an extensive process and represents
the reasoned conclusion of the IEP Team that the specific mea-
sures it requires are necessary for the student to receive a
[FAPE]. . . .  A school district’s failure to comply with the specific
measures in an IEP to which it has assented is, by definition, a
denial of FAPE . . . .155
If the IDEA requires complete compliance, then the standard used to
evaluate implementation challenges should reflect such compliance.156  If
the Eleventh Circuit had applied the per se approach to L.J., the court
may have determined that the student was denied a FAPE.157
VI. A BAD REPORT CARD: THE IMPACT OF L.J.
The decision in L.J. and the materiality standard it sets forth are
deeply troubling for students with disabilities who need IEPs in order to
learn.158  This standard significantly deviates from the principles in Su-
154. Van Dyun ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 828–29
(9th Cir. 2007) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (standing as one of the most thorough
arguments for the per se approach).  The majority opinion, though, did adopt the
materiality standard. See id. at 821.  The court reasoned that “minor failures” in
IEP implementation should not constitute a violation of the IDEA. See id.  The
majority opinion also cited to Rowley’s language that the IDEA’s purpose is to pro-
vide “a basic floor opportunity” to disabled students rather than a “potential-maxi-
mizing education” in support for its argument that the IDEA “also supports
granting some flexibility to school districts charged with implementing IEPs.” See
id.; Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207
(1982). Endrew F., however, clarified that more than “some” educational benefit is
necessary to provide a FAPE, making the majority’s argument in Van Dyun less
persuasive. See Endrew F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999
(2017).
155. See id. at 827 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the IDEA requires
implementation of all portions of an IEP).  The judge also states that this approach
does not impose too much of a burden on schools because they can amend the
IEP through the process laid out in the IDEA if they find that there are unneces-
sary portions of the IEP. See id.; see also Ferster, supra note 13, at 94–95 (quoting
Van Dyun, 502 F.3d at 827 (Ferguson, J., dissenting)) (referencing dissenting judge
in Van Dyun as critical support for per se standard).
156. See Section V.B for a full discussion on how the IDEA requires complete
compliance in order to provide students with disabilities a FAPE.
157. Compare L.J. ex rel. N.N.J. v. School Bd. of Broward Cty., 927 F.3d 1203,
1207 (11th Cir. 2019) (applying materiality standard and determining that student
was not denied a FAPE), with D.D., 465 F.3d at 506–14 (holding that “substantial
compliance” with an IEP was not enough to satisfy the IDEA).  If this kind of analy-
sis was applied to the L.J. case, the failure to implement the IEP entirely would
indicate that this was a denial of a FAPE to the student with a disability.
158. See Weiner, supra note 114, at 567 (calling the Ninth Circuit’s material
failure standard in Van Dyun “dangerous precedent”).  The same could be said for
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preme Court precedent and the IDEA itself.159  Further, it creates a path-
way for schools to break the promise of a FAPE, which is guaranteed
under the IDEA.160
Compliance with the IEP means complete compliance—anything less
than complete compliance fails to provide a FAPE.161  The IEP team
drafted the IEP, as required by the IDEA, with the idea that every provi-
sion and service outlined in that IEP is necessary to provide the student
with a FAPE.162  The IEP is the main tool by which this objective is
achieved.163  If the IEP is not implemented fully, this denies children with
disabilities their guaranteed right to special education services under the
IDEA and breaks the promise of a free appropriate public education.164
The Supreme Court in Rowley and again in Endrew F. wanted to pro-
vide flexibility for schools when it comes to how they decide to educate
students with disabilities.165  Nevertheless, neither the IDEA nor the Su-
preme Court intended to give schools unilateral power to change the IEP
the L.J. court’s adoption of the materiality standard here. See id.; see also L.J., 927
F.2d at 1207; Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 828–29.
159. See Section V.A, supra, for a further discussion of how the materiality
standard is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew F.
160. See Section V.B, supra, for full discussion of how the materiality standard
provides too much power to schools to change the IEP, which is not consistent
with the IDEA’s procedural requirements.
161. See Ferster, supra note 13, at 97 (defining “in conformity” with the IEP
under the IDEA as strict conformity).  Not following the IEP is therefore diverting
from what the IEP team agreed as to what would provide the child with a disability
with a FAPE. See id.; see also Knight, supra note 122, at 382 (articulating the idea
that compliance with the IEP under the IDEA means complete compliance, and
any deviation is not providing a FAPE to child with disability).
162. For further discussion on how insufficient compliance with the IEP dur-
ing implementation denies students with disabilities a FAPE, as guaranteed under
the IDEA, see Section V.A and B, supra.
163. For a discussion of how the IEP is the “cornerstone” of the IDEA’s prom-
ise of providing a FAPE to students with disabilities, see supra note 11 and accom-
panying text.
164. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2018).  The IDEA defines a FAPE as
special education and related services that . . . (A) have been provided at
public expense . . .; (B) meet the standards of the State educational
agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or sec-
ondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in
conformity with the individualized education program required under
section 1414(d) of this title.
Id.
165. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct.
988, 999 (2017) (stating that “reasonably calculated” standard holds school dis-
tricts to higher standard than “some” educational benefit).  The Court in Endrew F.
also gave deference to the school officials on how to best serve its students. See id.;
see also Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
209 (1982) (arguing that it is important to defer to schools in these matters, as
they have knowledge and experience guiding them in their decisions regarding
educational policy).
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through implementing only what they find material.166  The IEP process,
as previously discussed, has necessary procedural elements.167  Disregard-
ing this process hands over unauthorized power to schools to decide what
portions of a child’s IEP to implement.168
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in L.J. erodes the importance of the
written content in IEPs.169  Every provision in the IEP is included to pro-
vide a FAPE, as required by the IDEA, and is necessary to ensure students
with disabilities progress through school and gain an education, just like
every other child.170  To achieve this goal, schools must be held accounta-
ble for the full implementation of what is written in the IEP.171  Particu-
larly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew F., the materiality
standard used in the case at hand does not uphold the principles, goals,
and procedural requirements of the IDEA.172  Ultimately, the Eleventh
Circuit—as well as other courts applying the materiality standard—have
forgotten what one learns in school from an early age: there is no credit
for unfinished homework.
166. See Ferster, supra note 13, at 97 (arguing that giving schools this unilat-
eral power to change the IEP undercuts the procedural requirements of the
IDEA); see also supra notes 131–149 and accompanying text for a further discussion
on how the materiality standard is not in compliance with the procedural require-
ments of the IDEA.
167. For complete discussion of the IDEA’s procedural requirements, see Sec-
tion V.B, supra.
168. For full discussion of how the materiality standard provides unilateral
power for the school district to make changes to the IEP, see supra notes 138 and
168 and accompanying text.
169. For complete discussion of how the materiality standard disregards what
is written in the IEP, see Section V.B, supra.
170. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2018) (promising a FAPE to students with disabili-
ties); see also supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text for full discussion of the
promises of the IDEA.
171. See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
schools should be held accountable for what is written in the IDEA.
172. See Part V, infra, for full critical analysis of how L.J.’s holding is inconsis-
tent with Supreme Court precedent and the IDEA.
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